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This paper examines the determinants of foreign private capital inflows in Europe. Using the Hausman-Taylor 
panel estimator and data for the 27 European Union members, yearly since 1990, it compares determinants of 
capital flows into old (EU15) vis-à-vis new Member States (NMS). In addition to standard factors 
(infrastructure, institutions, etc), it focuses on the relative roles of economic crises and structural reforms. Three 
main conclusions emerge: (1) since 1990, NMS have received more inflows than the EU15, of which mostly is 
FDI, but the variance of these inflows is larger (until 2007) in NMS than in the EU15, (2) infrastructure, market 
size and institutions affect inflows to both EU15 and NMS, and (3) the negative effects of crises on FDI inflows 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the determinants (or drivers) of foreign capital 
inflows to European economies, with emphasis on a comparison between the old (that is, EU15) and the new 
Member States of the European Union (hereafter NMS.)  
The convergence process in the new Members States has been shored up in large part by deep financial 
integration and large capital inflows.12 Although the propitious external financing conditions of the last two 
decades helped the catching-up and convergence of many countries, the 2007 financial crisis questions the 
sustainability of the prevailing model of financially-driven economic convergence and raises a number of 
important questions (Berglof et al 2009; IMF 2010). Among these new pressing questions, we highlight: which 
are the main factors explaining the success in attracting capital flows across European economies, what is the 
effect of crises and structural reforms in this process, and which policies can contribute to the management of 
capital flows in a post-2007 crisis world.  
This paper uses macroeconomic country level data on unilateral net inflows and hence tries to complement the 
other large strand of literature, namely that based on firm or industry data and bilateral flows. We put together a 
unique panel data set covering all EU27 members, yearly since 1990, and encompassing an extensive set of 
determinants of international capital flows suggested by economic theory (per capita GDP levels, infrastructure 
quality, institutions, etc).  We pay special attention to the relative roles of economic crises, on the one hand, and 
structural reforms, on the other. The emphasis is also on trying to differentiate these effects for main types of 
international capital inflows (foreign direct investment, portfolio and equity.)   
The related literature is very rich and can be divided in two major strands, one focusing on the drivers of capital 
inflows and the other on their main economic consequences (benefits and costs). At the risk of a gross over 
generalization, one can say that the “drivers literature” tend to focus on identifying the set of FDI determinants 
in the so-called transition economies using macro country-level data, while on the other hand the “outcomes 
literature” focuses on the benefits and costs from international capital inflows using mostly industry and firm-
level data.   
Focusing exclusively on Europe,13 Guiso et al. (2004) study the economic growth payoffs from financial 
development using industry level data for 61 countries (1981-1995) and firm-level data for 26 countries (1996-
2001). Using the Rajan-Zingales methodology their results indicate that the payoffs of financial integration are 
higher in Europe than elsewhere. Brezigar-Masten, Coricelli and Masten (2008) study whether financial 
integration has non-linear effects on economic growth using macroeconomic and industry-level data for Europe. 
They offer strong evidence for threshold effects: the benefits from international capital flows are significant only 
above a certain level of financial development. Prasad et al. (2007) present cross-country and firm-level 
evidence suggesting that countries that rely mostly on foreign financing grow more slowly than countries that 
rely on domestic savings. This constitutes a challenge to standard economic theory and a powerful illustration of 
the Lucas paradox (Lucas 1990), on why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries. Yet, Prasad et al. 
stress that Europe is unique because capital actually flows “downhill" (that is, in accord with neoclassical 
predictions.) Abiad et al. (2009) use cross-country regressions to show that financial integration has a positive 
effect on economic growth in Europe, but not anywhere else: “the mystery remains since even after allowing for 
conventionally measured institutional thresholds, the European difference is significant” (2009, p. 245). Finally, 
Friedrich et al. (2010) ask whether emerging Europe is different and conclude that this is indeed the case (the 
growth dividend from international capital inflows are significantly larger than elsewhere) and, after examining 
several plausible competing explanations, attribute this finding to political integration. In short, a rich literature 
investigates whether the growth payoffs of international capital flows are significantly higher in the Europe but 
attention so far has concentrated on comparisons with respect to developing countries (while in this paper we 
focus on the contrast between NMS and EU15).  
Although the second strand of related literature addresses the same central question as we do in this paper 
(“what drives capital inflows?”), it has so far not been overly concerned with the issue of whether or not 
(emerging) Europe is actually different, which is indeed the focus of our paper. The literature on the 
determinants of capital inflows in the so-called called transition economies is arguably more voluminous than 
that on their growth dividend.14 Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Resmini (2000) examine the drivers for FDI into 
11 transition countries in a panel setting. These authors put forward the notion that the prospect of European 
                                                 
12 On capital flows and convergence see Henry (2007). Villegas-Sanchez (2009) presents evidence showing that FDI and equity inflows 
foster economic convergence, while debt flows tend to slow it down.  
13 See Kose et al. (2009) for an extensive review of the literature on financial integration and economic growth across the globe. 
14 See Blonigen (2005) for a detailed review of the econometric literature on FDI determinants, across the world. 
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Union membership played an important role in attracting export-platform FDI. Garibaldi et al. (2001) examine 
the overall level as well as the composition of private capital flows. One of their main findings is that although 
the allocation of FDI across transition countries is well explained by macroeconomic and initial condition 
variables, a similar degree of explanatory success cannot be replicated for portfolio investment.15 Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003) examine FDI inflows determinants across 25 transition countries stressing the importance of 
institutions in this process. The present paper builds upon recent cross-country and quantitative work from 
Campos and Kinoshita (2010) but differ in that instead of contrasting the transition economies to Latin America 
up to 2004, here we compare the drivers of international capital flows in the EU15 vis-à-vis the new Members 
States since 1990. The main finding from Campos and Kinoshita (2010) refers to the role of structural reforms, 
in general, and financial liberalization, in particular. They also find that “foreign investors are attracted to 
countries with more stable macroeconomic environment, higher levels of economic development, and better 
infrastructure” (2010, p. 329). As it can be seen by this cursory look at the literature on FDI inflows drivers to 
the transition countries (which includes the vast majority of NMS), the relative importance of economic crises 
has received relatively scant attention thus far. 
Our main finding is the identification of important differences within the European Union countries: since 1990 
NMS have received more capital inflows than the EU15 and these are mostly FDI with a much smaller share of 
portfolio (which is not the case for EU15). The volatility of FDI to NMS is significantly higher than that of 
portfolio inflows and, further, it is also significantly higher than the variances of the EU15’s FDI or portfolio 
inflows. Finally, the effects of crises and reforms on FDI inflows (negative and positive, respectively) are 
substantially and significantly stronger in the NMS than in the EU15 countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief conceptual discussion of the main factors 
highlighted by economic theory as relevant in driving capital inflows. Section 3 provides details of the 
construction of the data set and identifies various stylised facts regarding capital inflows, reforms and crises 
with emphasis on comparing EU15 with the NMS. It also explains the main features of the econometric 
methodology we use. Section 4 presents the main econometric results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
What are the main factors that help one country attract capital inflows rather than another? Such questions are of 
greater interest with regards to foreign direct investment than to portfolio flows, as the later should be more 
responsive to straightforward differentials in rates of return. Hence in what follows we centre the discussion on 
potential drivers of FDI. The vast theoretical work on the determinants of FDI focuses on ownership advantages, 
location advantages, and benefits of internalization (Dunning, 1993). Past studies can be classified largely into 
two groups. One focuses on an analysis of the determinants endogenous to the multinational investing firm such 
as the size of the firm and R&D intensity, and asks why a firm becomes a foreign investor. The other group 
examines factors exogenous to the foreign investors, namely, location advantages of the host country such as 
market size and level of economic development.  In the rest of the section, we focus on the latter group as this 
paper examines the determinants of FDI that are exogenous to the investor but endogenous to the host country.   
The literature indicates that the key FDI location determinants are the classical sources of comparative 
advantages of the host country. Firms choose the investment site that minimizes the cost of production.16 
Notably, host country’s market size and relative factor prices (i.e., natural resources, labour cost, and human 
capital) all affect the expected profitability of foreign investment. 
The emerging consensus is that it depends on the motives of foreign investors and, thus, which of three types of 
FDI they are undertaking.17 One first type of FDI is called market-seeking FDI, whose purpose is to serve local 
and regional markets. It is also called horizontal FDI, as it involves replication of production facilities in the 
host country.18 Tariff-jumping or export-substituting FDI is a variant of this type of FDI. Because the reason for 
horizontal FDI is to better serve a local market by local production, market size and market growth of the host 
economy play important roles. Impediments to accessing local markets, such as tariffs and transport costs, also 
encourage this type of FDI. 
A second type of FDI is called resource-seeking: when firms invest abroad to acquire resources not available in 
                                                 
15  The distinction between pull and push factors is useful in this context. FDI is mainly driven by country-specific determinants, while 
portfolio investment is mainly driven by external determinants (such as interest rates differentials). See Jevčák, Setzer and Suardi (2010) for 
an application to the EU New Member States. 
16 Wheeler and Mody (1992) provide a comprehensive summary of these classical sources of comparative advantages.  
17 See Dunning (1993).  
18 The mode of horizontal FDI is typically “greenfield investment.”  
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the home country, such as natural resources, raw materials, or low-cost labour. Especially in the manufacturing 
sector, when multinationals directly invest in order to export, factor-cost considerations become important. In 
contrast to horizontal FDI, vertical or export-oriented FDI involves relocating parts of the production chain to 
the host country. Availability of low-cost labour is a prime driver for export-oriented FDI. Naturally, FDI in the 
resource sector, such as oil and natural gas, is attracted to countries with abundant natural endowments.  
The third type of FDI, called efficiency-seeking, occurs when the firm can gain from the common governance of 
geographically dispersed activities in the presence of economies of scale and scope. Bevan and Estrin (2000) 
found that prospective membership in the EU, because it is conductive to the establishment of regional corporate 
networks, seems to have attracted more efficiency-seeking FDI to those countries after the initial announcement 
of the progress of EU accession.  
Together, the factors attracting each type of FDI suggest that the countries with a large market, abundant natural 
resources, and close proximity to the major Western markets would attract larger amounts of FDI inflows. FDI 
would thus go to countries with favourable initial conditions. However, research suggests that other factors also 
matter.  
Based on a survey of Western manufacturing companies, Lankes and Venables (1996) find that the main 
purpose of FDI in transition economies before 1995 varied substantially across countries. They observed a 
noticeable shift from projects to serve local markets to those serving export markets. Export-oriented FDI was 
then expected to increase as the market integration with the EU progressed.  
Another important variable for explaining the geographical distribution of FDI is a pattern of persistence over 
time. Compared to other forms of capital flows such as portfolio investment, the time series of FDI are generally 
more stable due to the high sunk cost nature of FDI. FDI is often accompanied by physical investment that is 
irreversible in the short run. Thus, a large amount of FDI in the country today implies a large amount of FDI 
tomorrow. Also, FDI is persistent over time due to agglomeration economies.  If agglomeration economies are 
substantial, new investors mimic past investment decisions by other investors in choosing where to invest. By 
locating “next” to other firms, they benefit from positive spillovers from investors already producing in the host 
country. Common sources for these positive externalities are knowledge spillovers, highly specialized labour, 
and intermediate inputs.19 There is much evidence on the value of agglomeration economies, although existing 
studies tend to focus on FDI in the United States or U.S. FDI abroad. A seminal work by Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) makes a strong case for agglomeration (and market size) in U.S. investors’ location decisions.   
Factor-endowment theory suggests that differences in endowments among countries are central in explaining the 
geographical pattern of inward FDI. On the other hand, the theory of agglomeration economies suggests that 
once countries attract the first mass of investors, the process will be self-reinforcing.   
A growing body of literature in economic growth argues that good economic institutions raise economic growth 
by promoting higher investment, higher educational attainment, and lower mortality. In the context of private 
capital inflows, institutions underpin local business operating conditions, but they differ from “physical” 
supporting factors such as transport and communication infrastructures. One possibility is that a fair, 
predictable, and expedient judiciary, an efficient bureaucracy and less corruption may help attract FDI.   
The risk of investment in terms of economic and political environment also affects the expected returns to the 
investment. In this respect, greater macroeconomic and political stability of the host country could attract more 
foreign investment (Bevan and Estrin, 2004).   
How these various dimensions are usually dealt with in the empirical work? In order to test for these different 
hypotheses, we include various classical determinants of FDI as the first set of explanatory variables. Namely, 
we measure country or market size by log of population. If investment decisions are of market-seeking nature 
(i.e., sell in the local market), then we would expect this effect to be positive. Natural resources endowment may 
also be an important factor, particularly for resource-driven FDI. We use (log of) the percentage of fuel and 
natural gas in total exports as a proxy for natural resource dependence. Log GDP per capita captures the level of 
development across countries, which reflects among other things differences in initial conditions. Inflation is the 
proxy we use for macroeconomic stability. We expect a negative sign on the coefficient of (log) inflation as low 
inflation is perceived by foreign investors as a favourable signal and it should thus lead to more capital inflows. 
High-quality infrastructure is another factor that allures foreign investors to a country. We use (log of) the 
number of mobile phone subscribers as our main infrastructure variable. Availability of a modern 
communications network is important to help integrate the domestic market and, given that other important 
                                                 
19 Industrial conglomerations arise because of technological spillovers, the advantages of thick markets for specialized skills, and backward 
and forward linkages. The new economic geography emphasizes the linkages effects: users and suppliers of intermediate inputs cluster near 
each other because larger market provides greater demand for goods and supply of inputs.   
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elements of the national infrastructure (for instance, ports, roads and internet services) are often complementary 
to telephones lines, this variable provides a useful proxy for the overall quality of infrastructure in the host 
country. We have also paid special attention to incorporating various aspects of financial reform (the contrast 
between de jure and de facto measures) as well as of economic crises (encompassing both the occurrence of a 
crises episode and its severity in terms of output loss). In the next section, we provide a fuller discussion of 
these important measurement issues.  
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The objective of this section is to present the data set and the econometric methodology used in this paper. The 
panel data set covers the period 1990-2010 for all current 27 EU members. Table A.1 lists the countries and 
provides their EU accession dates and income level classification. It also highlights the distinction between the 
so-called “Old” and “New” member states (i.e. EU15 and NMS). The former is defined as countries that were 
EU members by April 2004, and the latter as countries which became members of the European Union after 1st 
May 2004. 
Let us start by highlighting some facts our data suggests about emerging Europe and the nature and speed of its 
convergence process. First of all, the economies of the two groups (EU15 and NMS) still differ quite 
substantially. It is worth noting that although the GDP in New Member States experienced a steady growth after 
entering the EU, the differences in the living standards between Old and New members are still quite visible. 
Comparing per capita GDP growth or labour productivity since 1990 (Figure 2), one concludes there is weak 
evidence of convergence (although admittedly this ignores that some NMS have grown much faster than others 
and have, as a sub-group, converge to the EU15.)  
3.1 DATA  
The data collection effort centred on different forms of international capital flows, which correspond to our “left 
hand side variables”, and on their determinants, our “right hand side variables”. With respect to the latter, we 
consider standard capital flows’ determinants, financial reforms and crises indicators together with selected 
institutional variables.  
The three main forms of international capital flows we consider are: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
equity flows and portfolio debt. Data on FDI were taken from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2010) and 
from The World Bank Global Development Finance (2010). These represent the most used sources of FDI 
data.20 Portfolio equity and debt flows are from the latest International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (IMF; CPIS 2010). This is a rich dataset. The majority of data are available from 2001 to 
2008 and they include e.g. currency breakdown of portfolio investment to bilateral investment series. It is 
important to note that, in the econometric exercise, all international capital flows data were normalized as a 
share of GDP.   
In our sample, FDI represent the major part of capital inflows in both Old and New EU, amounting on average 
to the 3% and 5% of GDP in the period considered. Among the Old EU countries, the greatest attractor of 
capital inflows unsurprisingly was Luxembourg (15%), followed by Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden (all 
around 5%); while Malta (8.5%), Bulgaria (8%), Estonia (7.6%) and Cyprus (6.8%) were the best performers 
among New Members. Luxembourg received also the greatest amount of equity and debt flows, respectively 
231% and 60% of GDP, while the Old EU averages (excluding Luxembourg) were of 1.15% and 0.88% of 
GDP. Clearly, Luxembourg is an important outlier and the analysis in the next section is accordingly carried out 
excluding Luxembourg (from the EU15 and all-countries samples).  In the New EU, equity inflows were 0.04% 
of GDP while debt represented 0.12%. In short, FDI in NMS is a much larger component of capital flows than 
in EU15 where portfolio debt and equity flows have important shares. Moreover, FDI in NMS is more volatile 
than in EU15, while debt and equity is much less volatile than in EU15.21 Regarding the time path of the series, 
Figure 1 highlights that FDI inflows peak in 2000 in Old EU and in 2005 in New Members.   
We now turn to the standard determinants of international capital flows. In particular, from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WB, WDI 2010) and from the latest available Penn World Tables (PWT 6.3), 
                                                 
20 Another well known source for FDI data is represented by International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS). 
These data was not used here because of poorer coverage in the early years (until 1996) and because Belgium and Luxembourg are treated 
as a single country for the period 1990-2005.   
21 The hypothesis of unequal variances of capital inflows to the EU15 versus to the NMS can not be rejected at the conventional 95% 
confidence level until year 2007. As Figure 1 strongly suggests, the average shares of capital on GDP are significantly larger in NMS than in 
the EU15, again at the conventional 95% confidence level.    
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we obtain information about structural features, such as the size of the market (i.e. log GDP), development stage 
(i.e. log GDP per capita),22 and percentage of fuel exports over total exports (as a proxy for natural resources 
dependence). Data on macroeconomic stability (i.e. inflation) and physical infrastructures (i.e. telephone lines, 
internet users and cellular phones) originate respectively from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook (IMF, WEO 2010) database, and from the World Telecommunication ICT Dataset (2010). 
Note that all infrastructure data were normalized to population, in order to ensure comparability. 
In terms of a general assessment of capital inflows, although the EU15 economies represent a better 
environment in terms of market size, macroeconomic stability and physical infrastructure, the NMS are rapidly 
catching-up in all these fronts. Also note that the NMS may be better in attracting resource seeking investments, 
as the average share of fuel exports on total exports was 5.5%, compared to 3.5% for the EU15.  
To construct our indexes of financial reforms, we employed two major data sources: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2009) and Abiad et al. (2008). We follow Campos and Kinoshita (2010) and use the data reported in Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) to construct various indexes of financial development. The first index, an Overall 
Financial Development Index (fd1), is the arithmetic average of the normalized values of three variables for 
overall financial development, which are: the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (llgdp), the ratio to GDP of credit 
issued to the private sector (pcrdbofgdp) and the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank 
assets and central bank assets (dbacba). The second index (fd2) is reflects the efficiency of the banking sector 
(be) and corresponds to the arithmetic average of the normalized value of the ratio of overhead costs to total 
bank assets (overhead) and net interest margin (netintmargin), the latter calculated as the difference between 
bank interest income and interest expenses divided by total assets.23 
Figures 3 and 4 show the catching-up of NMS countries with respect to financial development indicators. In 
particular, the first graph highlights the development of the credit market and its increased liquidity, while the 
second show that the banking sector has quickly become more efficient, especially until 2006. 
Regarding Abiad et al.(2008), it covers 91 economies over 1973–2005 and it collects information on de jure 
financial development along seven different dimensions, providing also two synthetic indexes of financial 
reform and five dummy variables for financial sector’s policy changes. The dimensions considered are credit 
controls and reserve requirements (i.e. dc, cc, cco); interest rate controls (i.e. ico); entry barriers (i.e. eb); state 
ownership (i.e. pr); policies on securities markets (i.e. sm); banking regulations (i.e. bs) and restrictions on the 
capital account (i.e. intlc). The first financial reform index (i.e. fr) is constructed as the summing these up and it 
ranges from 0 to 21. The second index (i.e. ffn) is the normalized version of fr. As the previous financial 
development indexes, also this one is obtained following the Lora (1998) procedure and it ranges from 0 to 1.  
As for economic crises, the data we use is from Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010). Together, the two datasets 
cover more than 250 countries from 1976 to 2008 and have information about the initial and end years of 
systemic banking crises, the initial year of currency and debt crises.24 This shows that the vast majority of the 
EU15 countries experienced a systemic banking crisis between 2007 and 2008, while Finland and Sweden did it 
in 1991. All NMS, with exception made for Cyprus and Malta, suffered from banking crisis during the 1990s 
and Slovenia, Hungary and Latvia were involved in the 2008 crisis.  
The Laeven and Valencia datasets also provide information on output loss, fiscal costs, financial markets and 
economic performance during systemic banking crises. On average, output loss in the EU15 was higher than in 
NMS (1.75% of GDP versus 1.25%) while the opposite is true for fiscal costs (i.e. 8.2% of GDP versus 8.85% 
of GDP). 
Figure 5 shows output loss (oloss) expressed as percentage of GDP and computed by extrapolating trend real 
                                                 
22 With reference to PWT 6.3, following the recommendations of Summers and Heston (1991, p.344), we the real GDP data obtained from 
the chained series of relative prices, in order to mitigate the so-called ‘Laspeyres fixed-based problem’.   
23 The normalization procedure we use is the one suggested by Lora (1998) and it involves the following steps. First, calculate the absolute 
maximum and the absolute minimum of each series. This means finding the maximum (minimum) value across all countries and years. 
Second, calculate the range of each variable, subtracting the absolute minimum from the absolute maximum. Third, if the underlying 
variable is a “goody” (i.e. the higher its value reflect more financial development), subtract the absolute minimum from the actual values of 
the series and divide it by the range of the variable; if the indicator is a “baddie” (i.e. the higher values indicate lower financial 
development), subtract the actual values of the series from the absolute maximum and divide it by the range. In this case, the “goodies” are: 
llgdp, pcrdbofgdp, dbacba and the “baddies” are overhead and netintmargin. See Campos and Kinoshita (2010) for more details. It should be 
clear that this normalization provides an easy way to make comparisons which are free of scale problems. Consequently, in either a goody or 
a baddie, the best country performer (i.e. the one having the relative higher financial development level) has a normalized value of 1, so that 
the closer the value to 1 the better.  
24 According to Laeven and Valencia (2008), a “systemic banking crisis” occurs when a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience 
a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-
performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted. A “currency crisis” is identified by a 
nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 30 percent that is also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to 
the year before. A “debt crisis” is associated to sovereign defaults to private lending and to debt rescheduling. 
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GDP growth, up to the year preceding the crisis, and taking the sum of the differences between actual real GDP 
and trend real GDP expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP for the first four years of the crisis (including 
the crisis year).25  
Regarding the measures of institutions, we employed different sources. From the Polity IV Project, which 
collects 30 political related variables for all states with a population above 500,000 people over the period 1800-
2009, we selected three measures: the duration of the political regime measured in years (durable), the index of 
polity fragmentation (fragment) and the level of democracy in the country (democ). The first indicator reflects 
the absence of political crisis, the second is a measure of potential political instability and the latter indicates the 
strength of democracy. In particular, fragment is coded on a 0-3 scale, where 0 represents “no overt 
fragmentation” and 3 “serious fragmentation”, while democ ranges from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating a high level 
of democracy.  From Transparency International we use  Corruption Perception Index (ticpi), which is a 
measure of perceived corruption among public officials and politicians. It is available for more than 150 
countries, from 1995 to 2009, and it coded on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the lowest perceived level of 
corruption. 
The institutional evolution in the EU countries is fascinating. Figure 6 illustrates the democratization process of 
the New EU members and how quickly political convergence has been achieved.   
3.2 ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
Our study draws on the existing literature on the determinants of cross-country private capital flows, discussed 
above. Specifically, we investigate three main categories of determinants. First, we look into traditional or 
classical factors such as market size, infrastructure, and macroeconomic environment. Second, we assess 
whether structural reforms play a significant role in attracting foreign investors. Third, we look at the role of 
economic crises.   
In our baseline model, we specify capital inflows (FDI or portfolio) as a function of three main groups of 
variables: a set of classical determinants, financial reforms, and economic crises. The baseline econometric 









    (1) 
where Yit is the dependent variable which is measured as FDI and portfolio inflows as a percentage share of 
GDP in country i at year t. Xit  includes (1) classical factors (market size, natural resource abundance, 
infrastructure, inflation, institutional differences), (2) structural reform variables (depth of the financial market 
and banking sector efficiency) and (3) indicators for the occurrence and severity of economic crises. In addition, 
iη  represents unobservable country-specific attributes and tγ  is a vector of time-specific effects (e.g., time 
dummies).    
It is a well-known concern in the literature that some of the regressors may be potentially endogenous or 
predetermined. For example, FDI might be attracted to a country that has a more liberalized financial market but 
at the same time financial liberalization may be enhanced by the presence of FDI.  If we were to run the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on (1), the estimate would be biased as the error term is correlated with 
the regressors.  
The main strategy to address this problem is to rely on fixed effects model estimation. By so doing, we control 
for unobserved country-specific fixed characteristics that might affect private capital inflows. In this case, one 
estimates whether within country the progress in financial sector reforms is associated with greater FDI inflows. 
However, the fixed effects model yields biased OLS coefficients when endogeneity is severe. In order to address 
                                                 
25 Gross fiscal costs (fc) as percentage of GDP is computed over the first five years following the crisis using data from Hoelscher and 
Quintyn (2003), Honohan and Laeven (2005), IMF Staff reports, and publications from national authorities and institutions. Financial 
market performance is indicated by the peak nonperforming loans (i.e. npl) that is the highest level of nonperforming loans as percentage of 
total loans during the first five years of the crisis. Economic performance during the crisis (i.e. mingdp) is the lowest real GDP growth rate 
during the first three years of the crisis. As all these variables (oloss, fc, npl and mingdp) are calculated over more than one year but the 
available information corresponds to one single entry, we decided to impute the costs of the crisis to the median year of the original time-
window chosen by Laeven and Valencia. This solution, although somewhat arbitrary, has the advantage of exploiting all the available 
information (i.e. initial and final crisis’ year and its costs) in the simplest way.  Finally, it must be clarified that for the losses of output 
related to the 2007-2008 crisis, we were forced to impute all the costs to 2008. The reason is threefold. First, if the crisis started in 2007 (this 
is the case only for United Kingdom) and we take the standard 4-years window, 2008 is the year that should be selected according to our 
rule. Second, in the majority of the cases, the crises began in 2008 and they have not ended yet or, at least, no information about their ending 
year is available. Finally, GDP data from international sources are available at most until 2008. Putting these things together, it is easy to see 
that 2008 is the only employable year.  
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concerns about the potential endogeneity of the regressors, we adopt a Hausman-Taylor type estimator. 
The Hausman Taylor estimator fits panel data random-effects models in which some of the covariates are 
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We consider that the institutional variables in our model (e.g. Democracy and corruption from Transparency 
International) might be potentially endogenous and we use HT in order to instruments them. In fact, the 
estimator, originally proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), is based on 
instrumental variables: to comply with HT estimator we assume that some of the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the individual-level random effects, η[i], but that none of the explanatory variables are correlated 


















     (3) 
These baseline results are reported in tables 2 and 4 in the following section. 
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
The objective of this section is to present and discuss our main econometric results. First we introduce our 
baseline results (in that they focus on a set of standard capital inflows determinants) and then we investigate the 
relative of economic crises and financial reforms vis-à-vis these standard determinants. 
4.1 BASELINE RESULTS  
Our baseline results refer to a set of standard drivers or determinants of capital inflows. This set includes (a) 
market size and the level of economic development (measured by the log of the country’s population and per 
capita GDP, respectively), (b) the level of macroeconomic instability (measured by the log of annual inflation 
rates), (c) the quality of infrastructure and the level of human capital, (d) institutional differences and (e) and the 
relative importance of natural resources in each economy. The explanatory power of these factors should differ 
whether we are focusing on differences over time, EU15 versus NMS and within each one of these two groups. 
For the baseline estimates we also report both fixed-effects and Hausman-Taylor estimates as well as results for 
both FDI and portfolio inflows so as to provide a clear view of how the results change (or do not change) along 
such lines.   
Tables 1 and 2 present our results for the standard set of determinants of FDI inflows for both the NMS (upper-
panel of these tables), the EU15 (middle panel), and the EU27 (shown in the bottom-half of the tables). Table 1 
reports fixed-effects, while Table 2 has Hausman-Taylor estimates. 
The results reported in Table 1, show that the quality of the infrastructure, market size and institutional 
differences (democracy and EU accession) are important driver of FDI inflows to the EU15 and to the NMS. 
The log-log functional form generates estimates that can be read as elasticities; accordingly, a 10 percent 
increase in mobile phone users would, once all other factors are treated as constant, increase the inflows of FDI 
into the NMS by about 2 percent and into the EU15 by 1.5 percent. For the NMS sample we find that the more 
institutionally developed countries seem to attract more FDI, while an opposite result obtains for the EU15.27 
Indeed, when we measured institutions by the Corruption Transparency International index, the opposite result 
emerges for the EU15 (Column 3): countries with better institutions tend to attract significantly more FDI 
inflows. As noted, this is because our institutional proxies tend to correlated highly with a range of other 
institutional factors that also encourage capital inflows, such as regulatory transparency, low contract 
                                                 
26 Even if this hypothesis might appear to be too strong we mainly address our endogeneity concern on the institutional variable, that being 
rather time invariant they well be correlated with the country level random effects. We thank Ansgar Belke for this suggestion. 
27 As noted above, the EU15 countries receive the maximum score in the democracy measure throughout with one exception, namely the 
Belgium elections in 2007. This small relative decline is the main reason for this result.   
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enforcement costs, respect to property rights, and respect to the rule of law. Interestingly, EU membership plays 
a more important role for the case of FDI inflows within the EU15 than among NMS.28 Pooling all countries 
(i.e., focusing on the EU27), one finds that infrastructure differences seem to play the role of main determinant 
of FDI inflows.  
If asked what the fundamental determinants of capital inflows in Europe are, our results would suggest that 
institutional and infrastructure differences are large elements in such answer (we also find that population size is 
positively correlated with FDI in NMS and it is insignificant or negative in the EU1529).  Tables 3 and 4 confirm 
the importance of these factors also for portfolio inflows. Note that there is more divergence between the FE and 
Hausman-Taylor results suggest that these are less robust than the results for FDI. Also of interest, institutions 
still matters but in a different way: better institutions attract more portfolio inflows in the EU15, while worse 
institutions seem to attract more portfolio inflows in the NMS (although the Hausman-Taylor preserves the signs 
of these effects, they loose statistical significance). 
There is one additional determinant of FDI inflows to the NMS worth discussing, namely that while FDI inflows 
are attracted in the NMS to those economies that have a relatively high share of their exports in primary goods 
(agriculture and energy), this factor has the stronger and opposite (repelling) effect on portfolio inflows. It 
should also be said that, as many researchers before us, we found trying to explain portfolio inflows to be more 
difficult than, for example, trying to explain FDI inflows (when using country-level variables). 
Finally, there is also one additional determinant of capital inflows to the EU15 worth discussing, which is the 
role of per capita GDP. We do find some evidence that richer countries in the EU15 tend to receive more 
portfolio inflows than poorer countries within the EU15, and that the same can be said regarding FDI inflows. 
This is a quite interesting result because it adds a novel element on the discussion of the “European difference” 
in section 2 above. In this debate it is argued that the reason that emerging Europe differs is because capital 
moves downhill, that is, it moves from richer to poorer countries (or from low to high return on capital’s 
economies). In this light, our result provides some food for thought.  
A final issue to be raised before concluding the discussion of our baseline results regards the role of human 
capital. The latest literature on the determinants of capital inflows often highlights the role of various threshold 
factors reflecting different degrees of absorptive capacity. Two that have received the most attention are 
financial development (only once the financial sector has reached a certain level can the benefits of financial 
integration materialize) and human capital (the lack of domestic skills able to utilise the new techniques brought 
in by foreign investors can be blamed for the lack of benefits from financial integration).  We deal extensively 
with financial development below, so here we try to check human capital differences would be important across 
the EU countries in our sample. Although we do not find that this factor plays an important role (one can say 
that this is not surprising giving that the levels of formal education are very high in the sample), we do find that 
it is rather closely correlated to mobile phones. For this reason, when we argue that mobile phone subscriptions 
are an important explanatory factor for capital inflows in Europe and that they proxy for infrastructure, we have 
in mind a broader definition of the latter.  
4.2 WHAT ROLE FOR CRISES AND REFORMS? 
Taking into account (or controlling for) a standard set of reasons to attract capital inflows in different countries, 
what roles can structural reforms and economic crises play?  Tables 5 to 7 present our main results addressing 
this question. 
Table 5 presents Hausman-Taylor results for the role of financial reforms on attracting FDI inflows in both the 
NMS and the EU15 countries, as well as for the EU27. One main distinction we try to respond to is one that has 
received a lot of attention in the financial liberalization literature, namely that of de jure versus de facto 
measures. Kose et al (2010) argue that this difference account for much of the current debate on the benefits of 
financial liberalisation. De jure measures are those that reflect the changes in the laws and regulations that 
govern capital flows, while de facto measures try to capture not only the letter of these laws, but also how 
countries differ in terms of how they understand, interpret, absorb, implement and enforce such laws. Hence, we 
report results for both types of measures. 
As it can be seen in Table 5, our results suggest that financial reform has played a very limited role in attracting 
or repelling FDI in the EU15 since 1990. One of the few noteworthy results is that shallower financial systems 
                                                 
28 We also tested whether for the effect of NATO membership but found broader support for EU membership instead (Belke et al., 2009). 
29 It is rather surprising in that we find that FDI is attracted to larger markets across the NMS. Studies focusing solely on the transition 
economies do not tend to find such strong results, but in our case the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta may help understand this effect. 
Moreover, it is quite difficult too to fully disentangle market size from level of development effects, given that there are no lower middle 
income countries in our sample. 
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tend to be associated with smaller inflows of FDI in the NMS. This may be driven of course by foreign investors 
searching for higher profit rates which may be more easily found in other environments. The similar results we 
obtain for portfolio inflows in Table 6 (and for fd1 which is a composite measure of the quantity of financial 
services or of the size of the financial sector) may be used to back up such line of interpretation. In order to test 
the differential impact on NMS and EU15 of the financial system measures (namely international capital flows, 
financial reform de jure (ffn), financial reform de facto (fd1 or be) and Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) measure 
of deposit ratio) we report their interaction with the level of development (see “[X] Log Per Capita GDP PPP” in 
Tables 5 and 6 for the EU27 sample only30). On the one hand the results in Table 5 document a positive effect of 
openness to international capital flows on FDI only for countries with real GDP per capital above the 7400$31 
(PPP 2005) threshold, i.e. we exclude some of the NMS. On the other hand, Table 6 reports a positive impact of 
international capital flows, financial development (fd1) and Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt ratio on portfolio 
investment only for countries with real GDP per capita (PPP 2005) above the 4675$32, 28000$33 and 13800$34 
thresholds, respectively. To summarize, there is a differential impact of financial systems variables on FDI and 
NMS, due to their different level of development -in our example measured by GDP per capita (PPP 2005). 
Table 7 present the Hausman-Taylor results for the role of economic crises on FDI (the results can not be 
obtained for portfolio inflows as the crises variables are all dropped because of collinearity.) For the New 
Member States the results are very clear: banking and currency crises play major roles in stopping capital 
inflows. As the results indicate, although crisis occurrence seems to be the major factor, crisis severity also 
plays an important role. We do not find an equally important role for crises in the EU15.  
                                                 
30 The computation of the overall effect of the financial system variables on the FDI or portfolio flows can be obtained by composing the 
coefficients via the following  factorisation: Financial Reform{Beta(FR)+[Beta(Interaction)] X [Level of Development]}. Details available 
upon request. 
31 E.g. Latvia after 1999 and Romania after 2004. 
32 This is for all EU 27 countries in the analysed time span. 
33 E.g. Spain after 2005 and UK after 2002. 
34 E.g. Slovak Republic after 2004 and Poland after 2007. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
There is now a large literature examining the drivers of private capital inflows into the countries of emerging 
Europe. The bulk of this literature either studies exclusively NMS, restrict their samples to the transition 
economies, and/or compare them with other groups of developing countries. Our paper is one of the first to 
provide a comparison of capital inflows drivers between old (EU15) and new EU members (NMS). In order to 
examine the determinants of foreign private capital inflows (FDI and portfolio) to European economies, we 
assembled a panel data set encompassing all 27 EU countries, yearly since 1990. It covers standard set of drivers 
of international capital flows as well as measures of economic crises and structural reforms, both de jure and de 
facto. 
In our view, the reader should take four main conclusions out of our analysis. The first is that on average the 
NMS have received substantially more capital inflows than the EU15 since 1990. Yet the composition of these 
stocks is predominantly made up of FDI (in stark contrast to the EU15 and also to other developing countries) 
with a smaller share of portfolio (which is surely not the case for EU15).  
Secondly, we stress that the volatility of FDI to NMS is large and, it seems to us, has not received much 
attention from academicians and policy-makers. One reason governments prefer to try to attract FDI inflows, 
rather than portfolio, is precisely because the former is widely perceived to be more resilient. We find the 
variance of FDI to NMS is significantly higher than that of portfolio inflows and, further, it is also significantly 
higher than the variances of the EU15’s FDI or portfolio inflows (up to 2007).  
Thirdly, financial structural reforms have a differential impact on NMS and EU15, the reason being that we 
identified important non-linear effects. When controlling for the interaction of our financial reform variables 
with the level of development -in our example measured by the GDP per capita (PPP 2005)- we document the 
existence of a threshold effect, i.e. countries with a relatively low level of development might not fully benefit 
from rapid financial reforms or international capital flows (as documented in tables 5 and 6). 
Finally we find that the effects of crises –namely systemic banking and currency crises- on FDI inflows are 
substantially negative and significantly stronger in the NMS than in the EU15 countries (where they are 
insignificant). Currency crises, however, seem to have played a negative impact on the EU27 as whole, as 
documented in table 7. Our results suggest that economic crises have played an important role in determining 
the intensity and direction of capital inflows and that their impact was different for NMS and EU15.  
 There are a number of important possibilities for further research that our results open up, which we 
here highlight three. One is to assess how comparable are the results emanating from the “gravity literature.” 
Using bilateral data we can surely do a better job at least in explaining portfolio inflows (if indeed these are 
more responsive to straightforward differentials in rates of return on capital). The second is to push for 
improvements in the available measures of both capital flows and some of its main drivers (reforms and crises in 
particular). One principal way in which FDI is distinguished from portfolio inflows is the 10% ownership rule 
(inflows that generate ownership shares above this figure are counted as FDI, while those that do not reach this 
percentage are counted as portfolio inflows.) With foreign inflows shifting from manufacturing to the financial 
and construction sectors in the 2000s and (with the lift of restrictions to FDI in the banking sector, mostly 
among the transition economies) the attendant rise of cross-border loans from parent banks in the EU15 directly 
to their affiliates in the NMS, a finer delineation among these different types of flows than that currently 
available would be of substantial assistance. The third and last implication is to encourage further investigation 
of the volatility of these capital flows, as opposed to the so far almost exclusive focus on their mean values. 
Explicitly modelling their variance should also assist, because of similarities in the underlying methodologies, in 
disentangling the short- from the long-run effects of some key factors chiefly reforms, but also to a more limited 
extent, economic crises.  
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Table A.1: Sample of Countries 
 
Country EU Membership, Old Member 
accession before 1st May 2004, 
EU15 
Date of EU Accession Income Group 
Austria Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1995 High income: OECD 
Belgium Old Member (EU15) 23 July 1952 High income: OECD 
Bulgaria New Member 1 January 2007 Upper middle income 
Cyprus New Member 1 May 2004 High income: nonOECD 
Czech Republic New Member 1 May 2004 High income: OECD 
Denmark Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1973 High income: OECD 
Estonia New Member 1 May 2004 High income: nonOECD 
Finland Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1995 High income: OECD 
France Old Member (EU15) 23 July 1952 High income: OECD 
Germany Old Member (EU15) 23 July 1952 High income: OECD 
Greece Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1981 High income: OECD 
Hungary New Member 1 May 2004 High income: OECD 
Ireland Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1973 High income: OECD 
Italy Old Member (EU15) 23 July 1952 High income: OECD 
Latvia New Member 1 May 2004 Upper middle income 
Lithuania New Member 1 May 2004 Upper middle income 
Luxembourg Old Member (EU15) 23 July 1952 High income: OECD 
Malta New Member 1 May 2004 High income: nonOECD 
Netherlands Old Member (EU15) 23 July 1952 High income: OECD 
Poland New Member 1 May 2004 Upper middle income 
Portugal Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1986 High income: OECD 
Romania New Member 1 January 2007 Upper middle income 
Slovak Republic New Member 1 May 2004 High income: OECD 
Slovenia New Member 1 May 2004 High income: nonOECD 
Spain Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1986 High income: OECD 
Sweden Old Member (EU15) 1 January 1995 High income: OECD 




Table 1. Dependent Variable: Log of FDI 
inflows (% GDP) 
Estimation Method: Fixed-Effects with Heretoskedasticity - 
Robust and Country-Clustered Standard Errors 
Sample: NMS      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP -0.111  0.792 0.039 0.094 
 [0.17]  [0.99] [0.03] [0.19] 
Log inflation rate 0.074 0.022 0.152 -0.202 0.033 
 [0.99] [0.33] [1.79] [2.11] [0.47] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.029 0.124 0.116 -0.080 0.137 
 [0.38] [2.44]* [0.95] [0.36] [2.21] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.202 0.191 0.200  0.190 
 [12.22]** [8.60]** [1.47]  [7.00]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.112 0.138  0.586 0.140 
 [1.61] [2.02]  [2.64]* [2.25]* 
EU member 0.030 -0.002 -0.143 0.259 -0.006 
 [0.17] [0.02] [0.86] [0.64] [0.05] 
Log population  5.626 9.210 1.878 5.541 
  [3.23]** [0.94] [0.26] [3.58]** 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.052   
   [0.79]   
Constant 1.679 -86.558 -149.277 -33.057 -86.260 
 [0.29] [3.17]** [0.96] [0.28] [3.86]** 
Observations 160 170 114 165 160 
Number of Country 11 11 12 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4 0.43 0.12 0.29 0.43 
      
Sample: EU 15      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.226  2.886 4.041 2.537 
 [1.67]  [2.34]* [3.74]** [2.54]* 
Log inflation rate 0.173 0.216 0.239 0.080 0.190 
 [1.26] [1.34] [1.79] [0.43] [1.30] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.039 0.048 -0.180 0.076 0.105 
 [0.22] [0.22] [0.66] [0.40] [0.53] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.157 0.247 0.262  0.183 
 [2.04] [3.55]** [2.40]*  [2.28]* 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.372 -0.188  -0.343 -0.400 
 [20.48]** [4.13]**  [14.63]** [15.08]** 
EU member 0.711 0.805  0.684 0.656 
 [3.41]** [3.47]**  [2.60]* [3.15]** 
Log population  -0.795 -10.126  -9.654306 -9.290 
  [0.18] [2.62]* [1.59] [2.03] 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.231   
   [1.95]   
Constant -8.656 15.194 138.677 100.541 132.985 
 [1.11] [0.21] [2.40]* [1.30] [1.87] 
Observations 229 239 170 232 229 
 51
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.2 0.24 0.28 
Sample: EU 27      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 0.345  0.553 1.227 0.170 
 [0.55]  [0.84] [2.20]* [0.30] 
Log inflation rate 0.120 0.057 0.183 -0.092 0.077 
 [1.61] [0.82] [2.76]* [1.05] [1.05] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.071 0.092 -0.005 0.000 0.105 
 [0.93] [2.50]* [0.05] [0.00] [1.81] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.204 0.183 0.229  0.184 
 [4.45]** [5.10]** [2.93]**  [4.17]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.054 0.113  0.541 0.109 
 [0.64] [1.38]  [2.37]* [1.34] 
EU member 0.116 0.174 -0.233 0.146 0.172 
 [0.67] [1.33] [1.45] [0.73] [1.12] 
Log population  3.788 0.008 4.135 3.401 
  [2.10]* [0.00] [1.85] [1.64] 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.126   
   [1.36]   
Constant -2.858 -61.243 -4.953 -83.119 -56.693 
 [0.47] [2.09]* [0.14] [2.38]* [1.79] 
Observations 389 409 284 397 389 
Number of Country 25 25 26 25 25 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.3 0.15 0.23 0.3 




Table 2. Dependent Variable: Log of FDI 
inflows (% GDP) 
Estimation Method: Hausman-Taylor Estimator (institutional 
variables as endogenous) 
Sample: NMS      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP -0.111  0.792 0.039 0.094 
 [0.20]  [1.03] [0.05] [0.18] 
Log inflation rate 0.074 0.022 0.152 -0.202 0.033 
 [1.13] [0.36] [2.01]* [1.95] [0.51] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.029 0.124 0.116 -0.080 0.137 
 [0.45] [2.00]* [1.25] [0.60] [1.91] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.202 0.191 0.200  0.190 
 [4.77]** [6.06]** [1.94]  [4.64]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.112 0.138  0.586 0.140 
 [1.55] [2.09]*  [5.42]** [2.00]* 
EU member 0.030 -0.002 -0.143 0.259 -0.006 
 [0.17] [0.01] [0.73] [0.83] [0.04] 
Log population  5.626 9.210 1.878 5.541 
  [3.45]** [1.26] [0.60] [3.23]** 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.052   
   [0.65]   
Constant 1.292 -98.084 -167.174 -36.994 -97.546 
 [0.26] [3.43]** [1.28] [0.66] [3.14]** 
Observations 160 170 114 165 160 
Number of Country 11 11 12 11 11 
Sample: EU 15      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.226  2.886 4.423 2.537 
 [1.79]  [2.28]* [5.42]** [2.79]** 
Log inflation rate 0.173 0.216 0.239 0.005 0.190 
 [1.52] [1.98]* [1.92] [0.05] [1.68] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.039 0.048 -0.180 0.146 0.105 
 [0.24] [0.31] [0.86] [0.88] [0.65] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.157 0.247 0.262  0.183 
 [2.68]** [4.73]** [2.52]*  [3.08]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.372 -0.188  -0.333 -0.400 
 [0.90] [0.60]  [0.79] [0.97] 
EU member 0.711 0.805   0.656 
 [2.64]** [3.06]**   [2.44]* 
Log population  -0.795 -10.126 -9.654 -9.290 
  [0.25] [2.14]* [2.28]* [2.16]* 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.231   
   [2.33]*   
Constant -9.015 14.476 130.297 111.403 125.464 
 [1.07] [0.29] [1.93] [1.84] [2.00]* 
Observations 229 239 170 232 229 
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 
Sample: EU 27      
 53
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 0.345  0.553 1.227 0.170 
 [0.80]  [0.85] [2.92]** [0.39] 
Log inflation rate 0.120 0.057 0.183 -0.092 0.077 
 [2.00]* [0.98] [2.63]** [1.34] [1.24] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.071 0.092 -0.005 0.000 0.105 
 [1.02] [1.54] [0.05] [0.00] [1.48] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.204 0.183 0.229  0.184 
 [5.59]** [6.94]** [3.19]**  [4.92]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.054 0.113  0.541 0.109 
 [0.67] [1.44]  [5.87]** [1.31] 
EU member 0.116 0.174 -0.233 0.146 0.172 
 [0.81] [1.49] [1.18] [0.78] [1.19] 
Log population  3.788 0.008 4.135 3.401 
  [2.79]** [0.00] [2.26]* [2.31]* 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.126   
   [1.90]   
Constant -3.677 -60.961 -5.832 -83.574 -56.563 
 [0.81] [2.79]** [0.17] [3.03]** [2.43]* 
Observations 389 409 284 397 389 
Number of Country 25 25 26 25 25 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: Log of 
Portfolio inflows (% GDP) 
Estimation Method: Estimation Method: Fixed-Effects with 
Heretoskedasticity-Robust and Country-Clustered Standard 
Errors 
Sample: NMS      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 0.783  0.739 2.408 0.995 
 [1.17]  [1.78] [3.41]** [1.53] 
Log inflation rate -0.009 -0.047 -0.009 -0.106 -0.012 
 [0.20] [0.89] [0.15] [1.91] [0.27] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.206 -0.130 -0.067 -0.177 -0.151 
 [7.01]** [2.87]* [0.90] [3.13]* [4.27]** 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.256 0.331 0.214  0.268 
 [2.22] [3.51]** [1.89]  [2.41]* 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.084 -0.060  -0.055 -0.082 
 [1.47] [0.90]  [0.87] [1.28] 
EU member 0.252 0.249 0.295 0.162 0.207 
 [2.20] [1.86] [2.03] [0.96] [1.70] 
Log population  5.195 18.088 3.752 4.944 
  [1.02] [1.89] [0.59] [1.06] 
Corruption Transparency Intl   -0.008   
   [0.16]   
Constant -8.749 -81.736 -288.653 -82.441 -87.198 
 [1.40] [1.03] [1.98] [0.82] [1.19] 
Observations 86 96 82 86 86 
Number of Country 11 11 12 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.55 0.55 0.61 0.66 
Sample: EU 15      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.801  1.040 3.588 1.065 
 [3.85]**  [1.75] [5.73]** [1.78] 
Log inflation rate 0.066 -0.051 0.057 0.112 0.057 
 [2.36]* [1.72] [2.00] [2.01] [1.95] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.086 -0.155 0.029 0.131 0.031 
 [0.77] [1.35] [0.25] [0.73] [0.26] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.431 0.531 0.444  0.440 
 [7.04]** [9.64]** [6.68]**  [7.38]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.062 0.101  0.133 0.065 
 [4.44]** [7.40]**  [7.38]** [6.57]** 
Log population  5.852 3.797 2.711 3.804 
  [4.16]** [2.72]* [0.92] [2.69]* 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.003   
   [0.07]   
Constant -19.403 -98.180 -74.050 -83.725 -75.051 
 [4.00]** [4.22]** [3.70]** [1.87] [3.65]** 
Observations 111 124 111 111 111 
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.82 0.9 0.76 0.9 
Sample: EU 27      
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Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.508  0.240 2.949 0.847 
 [2.47]*  [0.45] [6.01]** [1.71] 
Log inflation rate 0.063 -0.023 0.037 -0.054 0.030 
 [1.46] [0.63] [1.25] [1.24] [0.95] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.164 -0.109 -0.095 -0.129 -0.110 
 [2.82]** [4.64]** [3.57]** [4.00]** [3.69]** 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.348 0.402 0.319  0.357 
 [4.06]** [5.95]** [4.69]**  [4.71]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.141 -0.038  -0.038 -0.077 
 [3.53]** [0.65]  [0.60] [1.32] 
EU member -0.031 0.167 0.270 0.046 0.151 
 [0.35] [1.54] [2.40]* [0.37] [1.75] 
Log population  7.262 10.811 6.960 7.235 
  [4.21]** [5.14]** [3.09]** [3.91]** 
Corruption Transparency Intl   -0.004   
   [0.11]   
Constant -14.509 -117.595 -177.891 -142.089 -125.302 
 [2.42]* [4.19]** [5.60]** [4.22]** [4.46]** 
Observations 197 220 193 197 197 
Number of Country 25 25 26 25 25 
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.66 0.75 





Table 4. Dependent Variable: Log of 
Portfolio inflows (% GDP) 
Estimation Method: Hausman-Taylor Estimator (institutional 
variables as endogenous) 
Sample: NMS      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 0.783  0.739 2.408 0.995 
 [1.22]  [1.35] [4.62]** [1.51] 
Log inflation rate -0.009 -0.047 -0.009 -0.106 -0.012 
 [0.14] [0.77] [0.18] [1.80] [0.20] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.206 -0.130 -0.067 -0.177 -0.151 
 [3.93]** [2.00]* [0.98] [2.56]* [2.32]* 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.256 0.331 0.214  0.268 
 [3.06]** [4.97]** [2.20]*  [3.20]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.084 -0.060  -0.055 -0.082 
 [0.96] [0.65]  [0.60] [0.95] 
EU member 0.252 0.249 0.295 0.162 0.207 
 [1.78] [2.13]* [2.37]* [1.06] [1.44] 
Log population  5.195 18.088 3.752 4.944 
  [1.42] [2.60]** [0.98] [1.37] 
Corruption Transparency Intl   -0.008   
   [0.15]   
Constant -8.686 -91.293 -324.156 -88.890 -96.066 
 [1.47] [1.42] [2.65]** [1.29] [1.48] 
Observations 86 96 82 86 86 
Number of Country 11 11 12 11 11 
Sample: EU 15      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.801  1.040 3.588 1.065 
 [5.88]**  [2.76]** [7.51]** [2.83]** 
Log inflation rate 0.066 -0.051 0.057 0.112 0.057 
 [1.70] [1.24] [1.53] [1.94] [1.52] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.086 -0.155 0.029 0.131 0.031 
 [1.36] [2.16]* [0.45] [1.34] [0.49] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.431 0.531 0.444  0.440 
 [10.82]** [13.92]** [11.31]**  [11.52]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.062 0.101  0.133 0.065 
 [0.76] [1.34]  [1.10] [0.84] 
EU member 0.000 0.000   0.000 
 [.] [.]   [.] 
Log population  5.852 3.797 2.711 3.804 
  [5.28]** [3.08]** [1.42] [3.11]** 
Corruption Transparency Intl   0.003   
   [0.10]   
Constant -19.730 -94.205 -71.580 -82.336 -72.583 
 [5.88]** [5.33]** [4.12]** [3.05]** [4.19]** 
Observations 111 124 111 111 111 
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 
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Sample: EU 27      
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.508  0.240 2.949 0.847 
 [3.91]**  [0.71] [10.21]** [2.36]* 
Log inflation rate 0.063 -0.023 0.037 -0.054 0.030 
 [1.59] [0.63] [1.21] [1.36] [0.85] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.164 -0.109 -0.095 -0.129 -0.110 
 [4.13]** [3.20]** [2.51]* [3.02]** [3.03]** 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.348 0.402 0.319  0.357 
 [6.99]** [12.05]** [7.40]**  [8.02]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.141 -0.038  -0.038 -0.077 
 [2.23]* [0.63]  [0.56] [1.35] 
EU member -0.031 0.167 0.270 0.046 0.151 
 [0.32] [2.13]* [3.19]** [0.45] [1.69] 
Log population  7.262 10.811 6.960 7.235 
  [6.69]** [9.54]** [5.36]** [6.54]** 
Corruption Transparency Intl   -0.004   
   [0.12]   
Constant -14.405 -115.521 -175.013 -141.303 -123.513 
 [3.62]** [6.64]** [10.25]** [7.11]** [7.24]** 
Observations 197 220 193 197 197 
Number of Country 25 25 26 25 25 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5.FDI and Financial Reform.  
Dependent Variable: Log of FDI inflows (% 
GDP) 
Estimation Method: Hausman-Taylor Estimator 
(institutional variables as endogenous) 
Sample: NMS      
Log population 0.604 2.846 -3.472 5.450 7.086 
 [0.10] [0.48] [0.68] [3.12]** [3.40]** 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP -1.550 -1.631 -0.540 0.217 0.165 
 [1.79] [1.88] [0.61] [0.38] [0.24] 
Log inflation rate -0.026 -0.009 0.081 0.037 0.037 
 [0.33] [0.12] [1.05] [0.54] [0.55] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.320 0.362 0.187 0.116 0.161 
 [1.51] [1.69] [1.08] [1.61] [2.15]* 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.193 0.192 0.207 0.198 0.174 
 [2.81]** [3.01]** [3.95]** [4.56]** [3.45]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.167 0.178 0.178 0.124 0.132 
 [1.99]* [2.10]* [2.02]* [1.67] [1.61] 
EU member 0.191 0.173 0.112 0.016 -0.027 
 [0.73] [0.68] [0.49] [0.09] [0.15] 
International capital flows 0.104     
 [0.97]     
Financial reform (de jure ffn)  1.013    
  [1.16]    
Financial reform (de facto fd1)   -1.830   
   [1.84]   
Deposit Ratio (Beck)    -0.834  
    [2.35]*  
Financial reform (de facto be)     0.709 
     [1.11] 
Constant 5.198 -27.784 65.866 -96.193 -125.731 
 [0.06] [0.30] [0.70] [3.06]** [3.31]** 
Observations 98 98 121 152 153 
Number of Country 8 8 10 11 11 
Sample: EU 15      
Log population -12.210 -10.555 -8.813 -13.254 -9.799 
 [2.03]* [1.70] [1.96]* [3.05]** [2.23]* 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 2.531 2.340 3.620 3.670 2.752 
 [2.42]* [2.06]* [3.61]** [3.81]** [2.87]** 
Log inflation rate 0.138 0.171 0.179 0.096 0.207 
 [1.20] [1.44] [1.42] [0.80] [1.79] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.147 0.007 0.265 0.219 0.099 
 [0.77] [0.03] [1.47] [1.34] [0.57] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.269 0.241 0.156 0.200 0.171 
 [3.66]** [2.67]** [2.47]* [3.34]** [2.77]** 
EU member 0.523 0.755 0.574 0.658 0.528 
 [1.90] [2.63]** [1.81] [2.42]* [1.85] 
Democracy (Polity IV) - - -0.379 -0.370 -0.397 
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   [0.92] [0.92] [0.97] 
International capital flows -0.868     
 [3.69]**     
Financial reform (de jure ffn)  -1.474    
  [1.29]    
Financial reform (de facto fd1)   -2.283   
   [1.63]   
Deposit Ratio (Beck)    -4.064  
    [2.94]**  
Financial reform (de facto be)     -2.446 
     [1.60] 
Constant 170.849 144.761 107.889 180.389 133.476 
 [1.91] [1.57] [1.63] [2.85]** [2.08]* 
Observations 202 202 210 218 222 
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 
Sample: EU 27      
Log population 3.663 3.88 -0.907 3.384 3.249 
 [1.45] [1.23] [0.31] [2.05]* [1.75] 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 1.432 0.446 0.027 1.562 0.939 
 [1.72] [0.45] [0.03] [1.27] [0.93] 
Log inflation rate 0.086 0.075 0.121 0.071 0.078 
 [1.18] [1.02] [1.70] [1.08] [1.17] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.067 0.046 0.193 0.103 0.088 
 [0.45] [0.32] [1.52] [1.43] [1.20] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.233 0.219 0.189 0.197 0.156 
 [4.38]** [3.68]** [4.28]** [5.05]** [3.68]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.011 0.123 0.107 0.075 0.084 
 [0.09] [1.07] [1.03] [0.85] [0.84] 
EU member 0.275 0.324 0.099 0.244 0.143 
 [1.47] [1.66] [0.57] [1.64] [0.93] 
International capital flows 4.697     
 [2.37]*     
International capital flows [X] -0.528     
Log Per Capita GDP PPP [2.45]*     
Financial reform (de jure ffn)  4.743    
  [0.49]    
Financial reform (de jure ffn) [X]  -0.579    
Log Per Capita GDP PPP  [0.57]    
Financial reform (de facto fd1)   -26.828   
   [2.08]*   
Financial reform (de facto fd1) [X]   2.472   
Log Per Capita GDP PPP   [1.85]   
Deposit Ratio (Beck)    10.534  
    [0.93]  
Deposit Ratio (Beck) [X]     -1.28  
Log Per Capita GDP PPP    [1.04]  
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Financial reform (de facto be)     4.512 
     [0.44] 
Financial reform (de facto be) [X]     -0.536 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP     [0.49] 
Constant -70.513 -66.299 14.244 -67.791 -60.964 
 [1.68] [1.20] [0.28] [2.20]* [1.81] 
Observations 300 300 331 370 375 
Number of Country 22 22 24 25 25 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. Portfolio Flows and 
Financial reform Dependent 
Variable: Log of portfolio inflows 
(% GDP) 
Estimation Method: Hausman-Taylor Estimator (institutional 
variables as endogenous) 
Sample: NMS      
Log population -45.549 -44.796 -21.347 4.846 3.096 
 [3.44]** [3.10]** [2.62]** [1.32] [0.86] 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP -2.689 -2.083 1.098 0.972 1.413 
 [1.94] [1.46] [1.29] [1.43] [2.03]* 
Log inflation rate -0.160 -0.145 -0.058 -0.006 -0.034 
 [1.98]* [1.68] [0.84] [0.10] [0.53] 
Log Nat Resources Exports -0.174 -0.197 -0.195 -0.148 -0.170 
 [0.86] [0.91] [1.25] [2.21]* [2.65]** 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.024 -0.092 0.092 0.257 0.277 
 [0.18] [0.65] [0.94] [2.96]** [3.33]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.026 -0.032 -0.061 -0.089 -0.106 
 [0.24] [0.29] [0.70] [1.01] [1.21] 
EU member 0.881 0.875 0.449 0.203 0.216 
 [3.82]** [3.62]** [2.51]* [1.39] [1.46] 
International capital flows -0.355     
 [1.70]     
Financial reform (de jure ffn)  0.410    
  [0.20]    
Financial reform (de facto fd1)   -4.424   
   [3.57]**   
Financial reform (de facto be)    0.596  
    [0.72]  
Deposit Ratio (Beck)     -1.620 
     [3.15]** 
Constant 690.416 672.219 363.402 -94.571 -65.935 
 [3.42]** [3.04]** [2.51]* [1.44] [1.03] 
Observations 46 46 64 85 79 
Number of Country 8 8 10 11 11 
Sample: EU 15      
Log population 2.324 2.031 3.322 3.432 3.276 
 [1.25] [1.17] [2.45]* [2.79]** [2.38]* 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 0.903 0.998 1.473 0.916 1.183 
 [1.73] [2.05]* [3.39]** [2.38]* [2.66]** 
Log inflation rate 0.045 0.039 0.050 0.049 0.068 
 [1.14] [1.05] [1.25] [1.33] [1.69] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.098 0.040 0.069 0.042 0.051 
 [1.23] [0.52] [1.04] [0.66] [0.80] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.477 0.442 0.451 0.466 0.426 
 [10.54]** [10.11]** [11.26]** [11.84]** [10.72]** 
EU member 0 0 -68.854 0 0 
 [.] [.] [3.54]** [.] [.] 
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Democracy (Polity IV)   0.072 0.061 0.063 
   [0.94] [0.80] [0.82] 
International capital flows -15.598     
 [1.78]     
Financial reform (de jure ffn)  2.639    
  [3.21]**    
Financial reform (de facto fd1)   -0.615   
   [1.24]   
Financial reform (de facto be)    0.908  
    [2.08]*  
Deposit Ratio (Beck)     0.892 
     [1.12] 
Constant 0 -45.429 0 -65.836 -66.277 
 [.] [1.85] [.] [3.78]** [3.47]** 
Observations 83 83 102 110 103 
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 
Sample: EU 27      
Log population 5.337 6.269 0.949 4.317 7.03 
 [3.03]** [2.81]** [0.45] [3.76]** [5.52]** 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 3.719 0.784 -0.115 -3.505 0.56 
 [3.12]** [0.60] [0.20] [3.44]** [0.68] 
Log inflation rate -0.018 0.025 0.022 0.026 0.032 
 [0.43] [0.55] [0.58] [0.75] [0.86] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.06 0.095 0.02 -0.129 -0.106 
 [0.66] [0.96] [0.25] [3.80]** [2.85]** 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.432 0.306 0.367 0.386 0.36 
 [7.40]** [4.57]** [7.87]** [9.15]** [7.68]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.127 -0.057 -0.091 -0.106 -0.078 
 [1.54] [0.65] [1.60] [1.95] [1.33] 
EU member 0.307 0.265 0.131 0.077 0.148 
 [2.36]* [1.87] [1.23] [0.89] [1.63] 
International capital flows 9.29     
 [2.83]**     
International capital flows[X]  -1.099     
Log Per Capita GDP PPP [2.98]**     
Financial reform (de jure ffn)  0.131    
  [0.01]    
Financial reform (de jure ffn)[X]  0.098    
Log Per Capita GDP PPP  [0.07]    
Financial reform (de facto fd1)   -35.599   
   [4.10]**   
Financial reform (de facto fd1) [X]   3.478   
Log Per Capita GDP PPP   [3.92]**   
Deposit Ratio (Beck)    -48.206  
    [5.18]**  
Deposit Ratio (Beck) [X]    5.061  
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Log Per Capita GDP PPP    [5.03]**  
Financial reform (de facto be)     -2.529 
     [0.29] 
Financial reform (de facto be) [X]     0.297 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP     [0.33] 
Constant -116.593 -109.091 -13.807 -35.658 -117.721 
 [3.98]** [2.65]** [0.38] [1.62] [4.91]** 
Observations 129 129 166 182 195 
Number of Country 22 22 24 25 25 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
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Table 7. FDI and Economic 
Crises.  Dependent Variable: Log 
of FDI inflows (% GDP) 
Estimation Method: Hausman-Taylor 
Estimator (institutional variables as 
endogenous) 
Sample: NMS    
Log population 1.307 3.116 0.983 
 [0.32] [0.76] [0.23] 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP -0.591 -0.26 -0.609 
 [0.94] [0.41] [0.92] 
Log inflation rate 0.059 0.044 0.034 
 [0.89] [0.68] [0.50] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.337 0.339 0.375 
 [2.21]* [2.26]* [2.41]* 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.208 0.194 0.216 
 [4.77]** [4.44]** [4.58]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.151 0.15 0.129 
 [2.12]* [2.15]* [1.77] 
EU member 0.036 -0.003 0.022 
 [0.19] [0.01] [0.11] 
Systemic Banking Crisis -0.525   
 [2.17]*   
Currency Crisis  -1.161  
  [2.81]**  
Banking crisis output loss (% GDP)   -0.003 
   [0.30] 
Constant -17.69 -52.388 -9.071 
 [0.24] [0.70] [0.14] 
Observations 142 142 140 
Number of Country 10 10 10 
Sample: EU 15    
Log population -9.172 -9.632 -11.351 
 [2.12]* [2.22]* [2.53]* 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 2.508 2.661 2.686 
 [2.74]** [2.86]** [2.73]** 
Log inflation rate 0.184 0.187 0.207 
 [1.62] [1.66] [1.78] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.1 0.096 0.059 
 [0.61] [0.59] [0.35] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.182 0.179 0.219 
 [3.06]** [2.98]** [3.35]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.4 -0.399 -0.413 
 [0.97] [0.97] [1.01] 
EU member 0.676 0.718 0.458 
 [2.48]* [2.53]* [1.47] 
Systemic Banking Crisis 0.242   
 [0.43]   
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Currency Crisis  0.409  
  [0.68]  
Banking crisis output loss (% GDP)   0.004 
   [0.33] 
Constant 123.877 129.566 157.068 
 [1.96]* [2.05]* [2.40]* 
Observations 229 229 217 
Number of Country 14 14 14 
Sample: EU 27    
Log population 2.227 2.098 1.273 
 [1.24] [1.18] [0.69] 
Log Per Capita GDP PPP 0.091 0.117 0.097 
 [0.20] [0.26] [0.20] 
Log inflation rate 0.103 0.099 0.111 
 [1.59] [1.54] [1.69] 
Log Nat Resources Exports 0.191 0.193 0.175 
 [1.68] [1.71] [1.51] 
Log Per Capita Mobile Phones 0.193 0.191 0.214 
 [5.01]** [4.98]** [5.15]** 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.103 0.103 0.072 
 [1.21] [1.21] [0.84] 
EU member 0.13 0.106 0.029 
 [0.84] [0.68] [0.18] 
Systemic Banking Crisis -0.337   
 [1.26]   
Currency Crisis  -0.785  
  [2.16]*  
Banking crisis output loss (% GDP)   -0.007 
   [0.89] 
Constant -37.028 -35.241 -21.486 
 [1.29] [1.25] [0.73] 
Observations 371 371 357 
Number of Country 24 24 24 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
